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Abstract Managed care (MC) imposes restrictions on
physician behavior, but also holds promises, especially in
terms of cost savings and improvements in treatment
quality. This contribution reports on private-practice phy-
sicians’ willingness to accept (WTA, compensation asked,
respectively) for several MC features. In 2011, 1,088 Swiss
ambulatory care physicians participated in a discrete choice
experiment, which permits putting WTA values on MC
attributes. With the exception of shared decision making
and up to six quality circle meetings per year, all attributes
are associated with non-zero WTA values. Thus, health
insurers must be able to achieve substantial savings in
order to create sufficient incentives for Swiss physicians to
participate voluntarily in MC plans.
Keywords Managed care  Physician preferences 
Willingness-to-accept values  Discrete choice experiment
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Introduction
Many governments try to limit the rise in health care
expenditure by prescribing or encouraging managed care
(MC) programs. Promoting MC is one alternative to tackle
expenditure; the other usually is increased copayments
(Trottmann et al. [40] for a discussion of cost sharing in
deregulated social health insurance). The term MC
encompasses very different institutional arrangements, and
its complexity does not allow one single broadly accepted
definition (see Glied [11]). The present study uses the
expression MC to describe the nature of the contract
between ambulatory care physicians playing the role of
health-care providers and health insurers as payers of care.
In this case, MC contracts are defined by their specific
obligations included in the contract, e.g., mandatory par-
ticipation in quality circles (see ‘‘Study design’’ section). In
mixed systems permitting choice, consumer participation
in MC can be encouraged by lowered contributions to
health insurance (for evidence about the reduction required
to induce voluntary participation by consumers, see e.g.
Zweifel et al. [44]). However, health service providers
must also be won over to MC to avoid quality problems, in
particular due to a lack of participating physicians. For
instance, expansion of MC plans in the US has been
hampered by difficulties in recruiting service providers. In
Germany, the creation of so-called Integrated Care centers
has been slow for the same reason. These difficulties are
compounded in countries with a shortage notably of gen-
eral practitioners (GPs), who play a crucial role in MC as
gatekeepers. In the case of Switzerland, only about 10 % of
medical students intend to become GPs, while retiring GPs
have difficulties finding a successor for their practice [4].
Hence, health-care reforms designed to foster MC need to
address the issue of sufficient attractiveness of MC practice
particularly to general practitioners.
Incentives for providers to participate in MC programs
are mixed. On the one hand, they have to accept limitations
of their professional autonomy, and possibly increased
financial risk (especially if they participate in the financial
success of the scheme). On the other hand, they can benefit
from regular work hours, shared investment costs, and
easier exchange of information within a network. This
article purports to provide information about physicians’
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preferences, expressed as their compensation asked (will-
ingness to accept, WTA) for departing from their con-
ventional job characteristics without MC obligations. The
evidence comes from a stated preference experiment of the
discrete-choice type (DCE), performed with 1,088 Swiss
private-practice physicians working in ambulatory care in
2011. The majority of respondents work in independent
private practice while participating voluntarily in some MC
schemes, which however account for a small share of their
patients (see ‘‘Data’’ section). While evidence based on
actual behavior would be preferable in principle, market
experiments can inform policy makers and health insurers
about the chances of success of planned changes, helping
them avoid costly failures.
This article is organized as follows. The ‘‘Literature
review’’ section contains an overview of the existing lit-
erature on physicians’ preferences, with special reference
to evidence from DCEs. The theoretical background to
understand DCEs and the methods to derive WTA values
are given in the ‘‘Methods’’ section. The ‘‘Study design’’
section outlines the study design and discusses the MC
attributes of interest. The ‘‘Data’’ section describes the
data. The estimation results are discussed in the ‘‘Estima-
tion results’’ section, and conclusions are drawn in the
‘‘Conclusions’’ section.
Literature review
The existing literature on physician behavior mainly
revolves around the impacts of different reimbursement
systems [18, 25, 27]. The precise nature of physician
preferences usually is not addressed because they do not
seem to affect predictions in a substantial way. Some
authors have nevertheless posited particular preferences by
including professional ethics, which in principle should
motivate physicians to hail MC treatment concepts such as
shared decision making (SDM) and critical incident
reporting (CIR) [7, 9, 43]. Attributes of professional
activity originally received little attention, except for the
rate of return associated with specialization [38]. More
recently, Gagne and Leger [10] have examined the choice
of specialty in Canada from 1976 to 1991 in response
to changes in fee-for-service rates. They find income
differences to be a significant factor. However, gender,
mother tongue, medical school attended, state laws, and
geographic conditions have a bearing on the choice of
specialty as well. With the spread of MC, research into the
determinants of choice of type of medical practice received
new impetus. Hypothesized attributes are reputation and
status [8, 29], properties of the medical practice [1], and
intellectual satisfaction [8, 9]. Kristiansen [15] has claimed
professional autonomy to be an additional attribute that
needs to be taken into consideration. However, the rele-
vance of these attributes, especially the non-pecuniary
ones, has been little investigated.
Against the background of undersupply in rural areas of
Norway, Kristiansen [16] analyzed the determinants of the
decision where to locate. Place of birth, place of residency,
and spouse’s place of origin were found to be significant
factors. However, they are not of overriding importance,
causing the author to conclude that the problem of under-
provision could be solved through the use of financial
incentives. In addition, non-pecuniary motives might be
enhanced in order to relieve the public budget, e.g. by
favoring medical students with a rural background (who
are particularly likely to settle there). The same conclusion
is drawn by Benarroch and Hugh [2], who investigate the
migration of physicians in Canada. Urbanization has a
significantly positive effect on migration, whereas distance
between major cities of a province has a significantly
negative effect. While this research is valuable for
informing policy makers about what motivates physicians
to opt for existing alternatives, it is silent about their
choices with regard to alternatives that are being consid-
ered but not available yet. In this situation, surveys and
market experiments can fill the gap.
The effects of non-pecuniary job characteristics on
physicians’ labor supply decisions have mainly been sur-
veyed in the psychological and medical literature [36].
Buddeberg-Fischer and Klagho¨fer [3] examine career paths
of 497 last-year medical students over a period of 8 years in
Switzerland. Respondents described versatility of the field
(96 %), intensive patient contact (87 %), positive experi-
ences during their studies (86 %), compatibility of work
with family (83 %), and possibilities of self-employment
(61 %) as determinants of their choice of specialty. In
addition, male students exhibit a preference for specialties
with a scientific orientation, whereas females, for settings
with intensive patient contacts. With regard specifically to
MC alternatives, Nordt [26] find that conflicts due to a
changed perception of the physician’s professional role put
more strain on practitioners in solo than in group practice.
Similarly, incompatibility of work and family may be more
of a problem in solo practice (2.8 out of a maximum of
5 points) than in group practice (2.3 points, difference not
statistically significant).
Market experiments of the discrete-choice type (see
‘‘Study design’’ section below) have been performed by
Scott [35] to investigate the preferences of practitioners in
the UK with regard to working hours, work load, time
spent on administration per week, out-of-hours appoint-
ments, and use of guidelines. Performing a DCE as well,
Ubach et al. [41] report WTA values for an extra working
hour per week and on being on call an extra day per month.
Wordsworth et al. [42] find differences between principal
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and so-called sessional GPs.1 On the whole, the evidence is
in accordance with the theoretical predictions by Marinoso
and Jelovac [22], who compare the performance of gate-
keeping and traditional settings, emphasizing the impor-
tance of non-financial motives for the payment of GPs to
create favorable incentives.
While this research is valuable for pointing to job
attributes that may be particularly valued (or resisted) by
physicians, it fails to inform about their attitudes with
regard to non-marginal changes. However, the transition
from conventional independent private practices to con-
tractual obligations with insurers constitutes such a non-
marginal change. Policy makers considering increasing
the market share of MC through regulation as currently
discussed in Switzerland need to know how much it takes
to win physicians over.
Methods
Based on random utility theory [20, 21, 23, 24], discrete
choice experiments (DCEs) are designed to allow indi-
viduals to express their preferences for non-marketed
goods or goods that do not yet exist. The number of
applications of DCEs to the valuation of health-care pro-
grams has been increasing during the past few years
[13, 33, 34]. For a review of the literature on discrete
choice experiments in health economics, see [5]. In a DCE,
individuals are given a hypothetical choice between many
or just two (binary choice) commodities. From these
choices, the importance (more precisely, the expected
utility) of product characteristics can be inferred. Inclusion
of a cost or price attribute allows determining the valuation
of the remaining product attributes in terms of money. In
the present context, the price attribute is an extra payment
per insured and month. The fact that respondents have to
weigh several attributes simultaneously makes biases that
plague contingent valuation (where individuals are asked
about their willingness to pay directly, holding all other
attributes constant) less likely than in a DCE [32].
The first step of a DCE involves the definition of the
attributes of the commodity and the levels assigned to them
[19, 33]. Here, attributes of MC are chosen to describe the
physicians’ work situation (for more details, see ‘‘Study
design’’). When comparing hypothetical alternative MC
contracts, a rational subject will choose the alternative
with the higher level of utility. The decision-making pro-
cess in a DCE can be seen as a comparison of utilities
Uni ¼ Vni þ eni and Unj ¼ Vnj þ enj; where Vni represents
the deterministic indirect utility of individual n from
alternative i, and eni denotes the pertaining unobserved
error term. Thus, individual n chooses alternative i (MC)
rather than alternative j (conventional practice) if (and
only if) Uni [ Unj, which implies Vni þ eni [ Vnj þ enj so
that Pni ¼ Prðenj  eni\Vni  Vnj; 8j 6¼ iÞ. Therefore, the
probability of choosing i rather than j implies that the error
term is dominated by the systematic difference in utility.
In this study, physicians’ preferences are estimated with
the aid of a random-coefficient logit model (RCM) esti-
mated by simulated maximum likelihood. The RCM has
three important advantages over the standard logit model.2
First, it allows for random taste variation across physicians.
Second, the RCM model permits unrestricted substitution
patterns.3 Third, it allows for correlation of unobserved
factors over time. The choice probabilities for the RCM are
given by
Pni ¼
Z YT
t¼1
eb
0xnitPJ
j¼1 eb
0xnjt
f ðbjhÞ db; ð1Þ
where the logit probability is called the mixed function and
f(b|h) the mixing distribution with distribution parameters h
(see Train [39], Chap. 6). Subscript n identifies the physi-
cian and i the MC alternative at choice situation t. Prefer-
ence heterogeneity is reflected by the mixing distribution
f(b|h), which is usually assumed to be normal or log-nor-
mal. The log-normal distribution serves to model a strictly
positive or negative preference, e.g., for the price attribute.
However, in practice the log-normal distribution may cause
problems for different reasons (see ‘‘Estimation results’’).
Therefore, applied researchers often keep the price attribute
fixed. The choice of adequate mixing distributions is
important and discussed in the ‘‘Estimation results’’ section.
The mixing distributions reflect unconditioned or pop-
ulation preferences. If no choices were observed, one
would only know that the coefficients follow f(b|h). In
contrast, observed choices allow conditioning the distri-
butions of b on the choices (y), permitting the derivation of
conditional or physician-specific distributions h(b|yn, xn, h)
of b (see Train [39], Chap. 11). By the Bayes theorem,
hðbjyn; xn; hÞ ¼ Pðynjb; xnÞ  f ðbjhÞR
Pðynjb; xnÞ  f ðbjhÞdb
/ Pðynjb; xnÞ  f ðbjhÞ; ð2Þ
where the denominator is the normalizing constant.
P(yn|b, xn) is the probability of physician’s observed choice
1 Principal GPs have ownerships in their practice, whereas sessional
GPs are freelancers (mainly young females with childcare responsi-
bilities) and employees of NHS boards (Scotland).
2 The RCM (or mixed logit) model is a generalization of the standard
logit model. The RCM reduces to the standard model if density
f(b) = 1 for b = b and 0 for b = b. Further, the random-intercept
logit model (RIM, also called random-effects model) treats the
constant as normally distributed with all other coefficients kept fixed.
3 This is irrelevant to this study, which is of the binary choice type.
What do physicians dislike about managed care? 603
123
sequence yn given b and the attribute levels of the chosen
alternatives xn. Hence, all quantities are known to derive
h(b|yn, xn, h) and to calculate moments of physician-
specific coefficients. Means can be simulated as
weighted averages b ¼Pr wrbr; with wr = P(yn|br, xn)/P
r P(yn|b
r, xn) where b
r is a draw from f(b|h).
Study design
In this section, we present attributes related to physicians’
professional activity that distinguish MC from conven-
tional practice. Specifically, we analyze preferences for
different forms of treatment concepts, critical incident
reporting, quality circles, preferred provider lists, and
generic drug lists.
The attribute ‘treatment concepts’ has two levels. First,
shared decision making (SDM) requires that patients are
more strongly involved in the decision-making process
concerning the choice of treatment. SDM is widely applied
in practice (especially encouraged by MC networks) in
Switzerland, at least compared to other countries [6]. It is
recommended in the medical literature as a way to make
the physician a more perfect agent of the patient. An
additional benefit of SDM from the point of view of a risk-
averse physician is to shift the burden of proof in a
malpractice suit to the (now informed) patient; however,
liability suits against physicians are extremely rare in
Switzerland. The downside of SDM is a certain curtailment
of professional autonomy. Therefore, the valuation of SDM
can go either way (see Table 1). The second level is
adherence to treatment guidelines (GL), to be developed by
physicians and accepted by insurers. They define how to
proceed in the case of certain medical interventions.
Guidelines are typical of MC; they are little known in
Switzerland. They entail a strong limitation of professional
autonomy combined with extra administrative work. They
do shift the burden of proof in a malpractice suit to the
insurer or agency (health administration) issuing them.
In view of the very low likelihood of this event, GL is
expected to have a positive WTA (compensation required).
Critical incident reporting (CIR) obliges physicians to
anonymously report critical incidents that happened in their
practice. On the one hand, CIR calls for extra time and
effort, and may give rise to fears of being interpreted as a
confession of malpractice. On the other hand, CIR holds
the promise of quality improvement in the treatment pro-
vided. Hence, the valuation of CIR can go either way (see
Table 1).
The third attribute is the obligation to attend so-called
quality circles (QC), another feature of MC. In QC, phy-
sicians meet on a regular basis to discuss new treatments
and interventions as well as experiences made. This benefit
to participating physicians has to be balanced against the
sacrifice of time. Interviews with physician networks
indicated that many of their members like to participate
in QC provided they take place during lunches and are
accompanied by presentations by fellow members or spe-
cialists. On the whole, no clear prediction about the
expected sign of WTA can be made.
The fourth attribute is the preferred provider list (PPL),
which restricts referrals to specialists and hospitals to
providers selected by the MC organization. This restriction
is expected to be undesired by most physicians. However,
some of them may support PPL because they believe in the
ability of the MC organization to identify providers offer-
ing high quality and/or high cost-efficiency.
Fifth, mandatory prescription of generic drugs if avail-
able (GEN) is imposed by most MC organizations in
Switzerland. Physicians may perceive GEN as a good
instrument for tackling rising drug expenditures; on the
other hand, it does restrict their choice of pharmaceutical
treatment. Therefore, preferences could go either way.
The sixth attribute represents the price attribute in the
DCE. It is measured as a payment (PAY) over and above
current income per MC-insured person per month (IPM).
To be in line with microeconomic theory, all physicians
should positively value PAY.
Table 1 Attributes and attribute levels in the DCE
Attribute Attribute levels
No contractual obligation to adhere to any item below versus
Treatment concepts Shared decision making: yes/no (SDM, ±), guidelines: yes/no (GL, ±)
Critical incident reporting Mandatory anonymous reporting: yes/no (CIR, ±)
Quality circlesa Mandatory meetings per year: 0/3/6/12 (QC, ±)
Preferred provider list Referrals only to listed providers: yes/no (PPL, ±)
Generic drug list Restricted to prescribe generics if available: yes/no (GEN, ±)
Payment Payment of CHF 0.00/0.50/1.00/1.50/2.00 per insured and month (PAY, ?)
a Quality circles are defined to the last 1.5 h per meeting. The signs after the abbreviations in parentheses indicate our expectations about
physician preferences
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An example of a choice scenario is shown Table 2.
‘Independent without obligations’ defines the status quo of
conventional practice, an option available to all Swiss
physicians. In fact, only 13 % of respondents report to be
in MC practice (see ‘‘Data’’).
In Eq. (3) below, the attribute levels for treatment
concepts (SDM, GL), critical incident reporting (CIR),
preferred provider list (PPL), and generic drug list (GEN)
are coded as dummy variables. Because SDM and GL are
levels of one attribute, they never appear together in an
alternative. Quality circles (QC) have levels of 0, 3, 6, and
12 (meetings per year). Coding them as three categorical
variables (QC3, QC6, and QC12) has the advantage of not
imposing a specific functional form such as the linear or
quadratic. Finally, PAY denotes the payment a physician
receives in return for accepting MC-type obligations,
ranging from zero to CHF 2.00 per insured and month
(IPM). With an enrolment of 600 (say), this maximum
corresponds to about 8 % of the median monthly income
[17]. Therefore, the deterministic part of the random utility
can be written as
b0x ¼ b1SDM þ b2GL þ b3CIR þ b4QC3 þ b5QC6
þ b6QC12 þ b7PPL þ b8GEN þ b9PAY
þ b10CONST; ð3Þ
where the bs are the taste parameters of interest to be
estimated.
The total of six attributes and their levels combine to
form 480 possible combinations of alternative MC con-
tracts. Using JMP to optimize the experimental design, this
number was reduced to 40 D-optimal choice scenarios and
randomly split into four groups, resulting in 10 choice
situations per respondent. Each of the ten hypothetical MC
contracts had to be evaluated against the reference case
with no obligations imposed.
Data
The Swiss Medical Association (FMH) supported carrying
out the discrete choice experiment (DCE) by including a
link to the web-survey in a newsletter addressed to all
members in private practice. In July 2011, a pretest
involved a randomly selected sample of 1,000 FMH
members. Respondents had the opportunity to write com-
ments, which indicated a good understanding of the survey.
Respondents were randomly selected considering eco-
nomic and demographic characteristics to represent the
ambulatory care physician community in Switzerland. The
main survey was fielded in August 2011 with a return rate
of 11 % , resulting in 10,461 observed choices by 1,088
physicians. This rate of response coincided with our
expectations and previous experience with surveys
addressed to physicians. A high share of 87 % completed
all ten choice scenarios, with 9.6 the average number of
choices made per respondent. The share of respondents
always choosing no obligations was 29 %, while 1 % of
physicians agreed to sign up to all MC alternatives pre-
sented. In addition to the DCE, the survey included ques-
tions about general attitudes concerning experience with
MC, education, and other demographic variables.
The statistics compiled in Table 3 indicate that average
age is a high 54 years (the same as the national figure, see
Kraft [14]). With 26 years of experience, participants are
somewhat past their halftime in independent practice on
average. Accounting for 19 % of the sample, women are
underrepresented in the sample compared to their overall
share of 32 % in the medical profession [14]. The fact that
relatively fewer female physicians participated in the study
again coincides with previous survey experience by the
Swiss Medical Association, regardless of topic. About
77 % of sampled physicians are married (5 % are single, 9
divorced) and have on average 1.65 children under
18 years. Some 52 % have their practice in an urban
environment, while 25 % are located in suburban and 23 %
in rural areas, respectively. The majority of respondents are
from the German-speaking northern and eastern parts of
Switzerland (73 %), while 24 % are from the French-
speaking western and the remaining 3 % from the Italian-
speaking southern parts.
Approximately 45 % of sampled physicians are general
practitioners (including gynecologists and pediatricians),
while 13 % are specialists without surgical and 13 % with
surgical activity. Psychiatrists constitute 16 % of the
sample, while the remainder declared themselves to belong
Table 2 Example of choice scenario
Attribute Obligation
You are to base treatment decisions on shared
decision making
Yes
You obligate yourself to anonymously report
critical incidents
Yes
Number of quality circles you agree to attend per
year
6 (1.5 h each)
You accept a preferred provider list for referrals Yes
You prescribe exclusively generics if available No
You receive payment of CHF 1.50/IPMa
I am willing to sign the MC contract with these
obligations
h
I would like to remain independent without
obligations
h
a Payment is in CHF per insured per month (IPM). 1 CHF &
1.1 USD at 2011 exchange rates
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to other groups or failed to state their specialty. Most
physicians work in single practice on their own account
(51 %), which means that their income or profit depends on
their own services. Approximately a third (30 %, not
shown in Table 3) work in shared or group practices but
bill their services individually. This is in contrast to shared
practices with a common account, which bill regardless of
who in the practice actually provided the services. These
shared practices with so-called common accounting are
rare (5 %). The MC setting is predominantly characterized
by networks where members continue to work on their own
account (12 % of respondents); common-account networks
are the exception (1 %). Among physicians in shared
practice, 61 % work in a team of two, 24 % in a team of
three, and 8 % in a team of four physicians. Maximum
team size reported is a low nine physicians.
In the attitudinal part of the survey, participants were
asked about their experiences with MC. This information is
used in the ‘‘Effects of prior experience’’ section to explore
experience-related differences in WTA values with respect
to MC attributes. Concerning treatment concepts, 57 %
have experience with shared decision making and 51 %
with treatment guidelines. About 27 % of sampled physi-
cians collected experience with critical incident reporting.
Quality circles are the most prominent MC feature, with 60
physicians having attended meetings at least once. As to
the most restrictive MC features, only 14 % stated expe-
rience with preferred provider lists and 27 % with generic
drug lists.
Estimation results
Table 4 shows the estimated distribution parameters for
two different model specifications. Both are estimated by
simulated maximum likelihood using 500 Halton draws
[12]. The left panel of Table 4 pertains to the random-
intercept model (RIM) specification, where all coefficients
are kept fixed with the exception of the constant, for which
a normal distribution is assumed. The constant captures
unobserved physician-specific effects. The right panel
displays the parameters pertaining to the random-coeffi-
cient model (RCM), where all coefficients are assumed to
be normally distributed (reflecting the theoretical expec-
tations listed in Table 1), with the exception of a fixed
coefficient for PAY. Revelt and Train [28] give three
reasons for keeping the price attribute fixed. First, it
facilitates the calculation of population WTA values.
Second, RCM estimates tend to be unstable when all
coefficients are random [31]. Third, the appropriate choice
of mixing distribution for the price attribute is not
straightforward. The most frequently applied log-normal
distribution does often not converge in practice. Further, it
renders estimates of the price coefficient that are very close
to zero, causing implausibly high WTA values [37].
Therefore, the WTA values (see Fig. 1 of the ‘‘Willingness
to accept MC-type obligations’’ section) capture only
preference heterogeneity from the MC attributes but no
heterogeneity with respect to PAY, and hence marginal
utility of income (which may be substantial in view of the
dispersion of medical income documented by Ku¨nzi et al.
[17]).
The simulated log-likelihood (SLL) values at conver-
gence are -4,549.7 (RIM) and -4,261.0 (RCM), while the
AICs are 9,121.3 (RIM) and 8,559.9 (RCM), respectively.
Therefore, goodness of fit speaks in favor of RCM esti-
mates, which are emphasized in the discussion below.
Table 4 shows estimated mean and standard deviation
parameters along with their standard errors (SE). The mean
parameters are insignificant for CIR (RIM) and six meet-
ings per year for both specifications. All remaining
parameters are highly significant with a p value below 0.01.
Table 3 Respondent
descriptives, Swiss ambulatory
care physicians (2011)
General practitioners include
gynecologists and pediatricians.
Statistics are mean (MN),
standard deviation (SD), and
median (MD)
Variable MN SD
Percentiles
5th MD 95th
Age of physician 53.73 8.25 40.00 54.00 66.00
Job experience (in years) 26.00 9.74 11.00 27.00 39.00
Male respondents 0.81 – – – –
Married 0.77 – – – –
Number of children under 18 1.65 1.70 0.00 2.00 4.00
Urban practices 0.52 – – – –
Suburban practices 0.24 – – – –
Rural practices 0.23 – – – –
General practitioners 0.45 – – – –
Specialists without surgery 0.13 – – – –
Specialists with surgery 0.13 – – – –
Psychiatrists 0.16 – – – –
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Share of physicians who dislike MC
The estimated parameters for the population distributions
can be used to calculate population shares of physicians
with negative preferences for MC. For attribute k, this
share is given by Pðbk\0Þ ¼ UðMNk=SDkÞ; where U is
the cumulative normal distribution, and MNk and SDk are
the estimated mean and standard deviation, as given in
Table 4. An alternative approach is to calculate the share of
negative physician-specific coefficients using Eq. (2),
which has the advantage of conditioning on individual
choices observed. Therefore, the conditioned shares are
discussed below, while the unconditioned shares are shown
in parentheses.
Regarding MC-type treatment concepts, only 9 (31) %
of physicians have a distaste for shared decision making,
while no less than 86 (73) % dislike guidelines. Similarly,
the share of physicians opposing critical incident reporting
attains 93 (70) %. Almost all physicians (1 % rejecting)
like to attend three quality circles per year. However,
acceptance already decreases for six meetings per year,
with 38 (45) % against. Finally, a full 92 (79) % dislike to
be obliged to participate in 12 meetings per year. In sum,
about one-half of sampled physicians are willing to
participate in up to six quality circles without being com-
pensated. The MC attribute with the highest share of
opposing physicians is the preferred provider list with 94
(88) %. Restricting drug prescriptions to generics if
available is still refused by 88 (79) %. These findings
suggest that with the exception of shared decision making
and up to six quality circle meetings per year, all MC-type
attributes have to be compensated if a majority of Swiss
physicians are to be won over to MC.
Willingness to accept MC-type obligations
Next, we focus on the physician-specific willingness-to-
accept (WTA) values for MC attributes, shown in Table 5.
The discussion concentrates on the median values from the
RCM because they are more robust to outliers than the
mean values.
The negative WTA value for SDM indicates that the
median Swiss physician need not to be compensated for
involving patients in the decision making about choice of
treatment. In contrast, following guidelines has to be
compensated with about 3.57 CHF per MC-insured per
month (CHF/IPM). Critical incident reporting was shown
to have a small, insignificant effect on the choice prob-
abilities (Table 4). This is reflected by a WTA value of
only 0.34 CHF/IPM; this low value likely reflects physi-
cians’ belief that CIR contributes to an increase in treat-
ment quality. Quality circles are positively valued up to
six meetings per year by the median respondent. Hence,
including up to six quality circles in a MC contract allows
Table 4 Preferences for
managed care attributes—
regression results
a Number of physicians: 1,088;
number of choices observed:
10,461. Coefficients for RCM
are all assumed to be normally
distributed, with the exception
of a fixed coefficient for PAY
Attribute Parameter
Random- intercept model
(RIM)
Random-coefficient model
(RCM)
Value SE Value S.E.
Shared decision making (SDM) Mean 0.38 (0.07) 0.48 (0.09)
SD 0.95 (0.16)
Guidelines (GL) Mean -0.66 (0.09) -1.49 (0.19)
SD 2.43 (0.26)
Critical incident reporting (CIR) Mean -0.06 (0.06) -0.16 (0.09)
SD 0.31 (0.16)
Three quality circles (QC3) Mean 0.33 (0.09) 0.30 (0.11)
SD 0.10 (0.22)
Six quality circles (QC6) Mean 0.04 (0.09) 0.10 (0.11)
SD 0.79 (0.18)
Twelve quality circles (QC12) Mean -0.91 (0.10) -1.66 (0.18)
SD 2.09 (0.20)
Preferred provider list (PPL) Mean -1.42 (0.07) -2.28 (0.13)
SD 1.95 (0.14)
Generic drug list (GEN) Mean -0.89 (0.07) -1.66 (0.12)
SD 2.09 (0.15)
Payment (PAY) a Mean 0.37 (0.05) 0.49 (0.06)
SD
Constant (CONST) Mean -0.73 (0.13) -0.64 (0.16)
SD 1.79 (0.07) 1.86 (0.11)
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reducing the overall compensation required. Nevertheless,
this reduction is too low to play a crucial role in attracting
physicians to participate in MC. In addition, 12 meetings
already have to be compensated at the tune of 3.71 CHF/
IPM. Restricting referrals to providers listed by insurers
is strongly opposed and requires the highest compensa-
tion of all MC-type attributes. Its median WTA is 5.27
CHF/IPM. The next-highest WTA value pertains to the
restriction to prescribe only generics if available (GEN),
with 4.06 CHF/IPM. A likely reason for this high figure is
the fact that about one-half of Swiss physicians live in
jurisdictions permitting them to dispense drugs on their
own account [30]. Therefore, the GEN attribute entails the
loss of an option to generate extra income for many
respondents.
In view of the entries of Table 5, the question arises of
whether current extra payments by insurers suffice to win
physicians over to MC. A typical value is 1.50 CHF/IPM
for participating in a health maintenance organization
(HMO), the most restrictive MC variant (preferred provider
organizations and gatekeeping networks also exist in
Switzerland). Clearly, this extra payment falls far short of
what it takes to make the median Swiss physician join an
HMO. To the extent that it reflects achievable cost savings
due to MC, these savings could easily be insufficient for
MC to increase its current market share.
Because the coefficient of PAY is kept fixed, the WTA
values have the same distributions as the random coeffi-
cients for the MC attributes. The histograms of Fig. 1 point
to substantial heterogeneity of preferences, especially with
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Fig. 1 Histograms of
physician-specific WTA values
Table 5 Willingness to accept
MC-type obligations
WTA values (mean denoted by
MN and median by MD) are
shown in CHF per insured and
month (CHF/IPM) using
physician-specific coefficients;
1 CHF & 1.1 USD at 2011
exchange rates
Attribute Abbrev. RIM RCM
MN MD Percentiles
MN 5th 95th
Shared decision making SDM -1.03 -1.00 -0.86 -2.56 0.31
Guidelines GL 1.80 3.05 3.57 -2.31 6.53
Critical incident reporting CIR 0.17 0.33 0.34 -0.10 0.66
Three quality circles QC3 -0.89 -0.61 -0.61 -0.73 -0.50
Six quality circles QC6 -0.11 -0.21 -0.17 -1.53 0.90
Twelve quality circles QC12 2.46 3.46 3.71 -0.83 6.67
Preferred provider list PPL 3.87 4.70 5.27 -0.18 8.15
Generic drug list GEN 2.43 3.53 4.06 -1.54 7.40
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regard to GL, PPL, and GEN. Opinions appear to be
strongly divided concerning GL and GEN in particular,
where bi-modality is evident. In the case of GEN, this
likely reflects the divide between physicians who dispense
drugs on their own account and those who do not.
Effects of prior experience
The preference patterns and WTA values found in the
previous section do not distinguish between different
groups of physicians. This section is devoted to the ques-
tion of whether prior experience with a MC setting makes a
difference; differences between general practitioners and
specialists are discussed in the next section.
To test for differences between physicians with and
without MC experience, all attributes are interacted with a
dummy indicating whether respondents declared have
made experience with this specific MC attribute. Table 8 of
the ‘‘Appendix’’ (left-hand side) shows the estimated dis-
tribution parameters for the RCM containing this type of
interaction. The physician-specific WTA values estimated
for physicians with and without experience with the per-
tinent MC attribute are displayed in Table 6. In general,
physicians with experience have lower WTA values,
indicating less resistance against or even a preference for
the MC feature. There are two reasons for this effect. First,
physicians may like MC because of their favorable expe-
rience. Second, however, self-selection may be at work.
Physicians with a preference for MC are likely to have
selected this setting, causing them to have prior MC
experience. As will be argued below, disentangling the two
directions of causality is not worthwhile in the present
policy context.
The discussion is limited to the most salient differences.
They concern SDM, PPL, and GEN. First, physicians
stating that they have never had experience with SDM
dislike involving patients in the decision-making process.
They ask for a median compensation of 0.72 CHF/IPM for
SDM. In contrast, physicians with experience in SDM have
a positive preference for it and do not have to be com-
pensated. Second, physicians who have worked with a
preferred provider list (PPL) exhibit a median WTA value
of 2.98 CHF/IPM, less than one-half of that characterizing
their colleagues without that experience (6.30 CHF/IPM).
Third, restricting drug prescription to generics has a med-
ian WTA of 3.72 CHF/IPM among physicians who have
applied such a list, compared to 5.52 CHF/IPM for those
who have not.
While it would be of scientific interest to distinguish the
effect of prior experience from a possible self-selection
effect, for policy makers attempting to increase the market
share of MC, this is a moot point. They need to win over
physicians without prior MC experience. This means that
the achievable cost savings must suffice to finance the
higher compensations requested by this group—letting
alone the compensation asked by Swiss consumers as
estimated by another DCE [44].
Differences between GPs and specialists
In the survey, physicians were asked to state if they are
general practitioners (GPs, including gynecologists and
pediatricians), specialists with and without surgical activ-
ities, or psychiatrists. Because GPs play a crucial role in
MC as gatekeepers for their patients, this section compares
their preferences with those of their specialized colleagues
who are grouped together as ‘specialists.’ The same RCM
is estimated as in the ‘‘Estimation results’’ section, but this
time with MC attributes that interacted with a dummy
variable, indicating whether the respondent is a specialist
Table 6 Willingness-to-accept values by experience
Attribute Physicians without experience Physicians with experience
MN MD Percentiles MN MD Percentiles
5th 95th 5th 95th
Shared decision making 0.52 0.72 -1.40 2.25 -2.28 -2.09 -4.44 -0.40
Guidelines 3.80 3.85 1.46 5.55 0.89 1.22 -2.55 3.19
Critical incident reporting 0.72 0.75 0.13 1.20 -0.35 -0.34 -1.54 0.90
Three quality circles 0.37 0.37 0.30 0.44 -1.32 -1.32 -1.59 -1.04
Six quality circles 1.59 1.59 1.54 1.62 -1.39 -1.39 -1.44 -1.33
Twelve quality circles 5.08 5.18 1.95 7.45 2.95 3.05 -1.41 6.57
Preferred provider list 5.61 6.30 -0.37 9.38 2.78 2.98 -2.94 7.46
Generic drug list 4.64 5.52 -2.18 9.15 3.48 3.72 -2.24 8.69
WTA values are shown in CHF per insured per month, IPM using physician-specific WTA values from RCM, containing interactions.
‘Experience’ refers to the particular MC attributes listed
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or not. In analogy to the previous section, estimated dis-
tribution parameters are relegated to Table 8 of the
‘‘Appendix’’ (right-hand side). Table 7 displays the calcu-
lated physician-specific WTA values.
With regard to most MC-type attributes, WTA values do
not markedly differ between GPs and specialists. There are
two exceptions. One is the preferred provider list (PPL), for
which the median GP would have to be compensated at the
tune of 3.64 CHF/IPM, compared to 6.53 CHF/IPM for the
median specialist, the overall maximum found in this
study. This discrepancy is intuitive for three reasons. First,
a specialist who joins a MC network depends on referrals
from GPs (potentially governed by a PPL) in an even more
decisive way than in conventional practice, whereas
referrals play a minor role in either setting for a GP. Sec-
ond, many specialists serve more than one MC network, in
which case a PPL imposed by one of the networks can hurt
them. By way of contrast, GPs typically work for a single
MC organization; there is no need for them to rely on
demand emanating from other MC organizations. Finally,
specialized physicians may feel that they know better than
GPs which providers to choose for their patients or net-
works. The second discrepancy concerns the generic drug
list (GEN), where GPs have to be compensated with a
median of 3.06 CHF/IPM, but specialists with 4.44 CHF/
IPM. A likely explanation is that specialists are more likely
than GPs to treat rare diseases that might call for a brand-
name drug, which is not listed.
On the whole, general practitioners are found to be
less strongly opposed to attributes of MC. Thus, winning
them over to MC is less costly than estimated in ‘‘Esti-
mation results’’ section based on the whole sample. Still,
a payment of 1.50 CHF/IPM remains insufficient for
attracting a majority of GPs to an MC organization that
imposes guidelines requiring more than six quality circle
meetings per year, a preferred provider list, or a generic
drug list.
Conclusions
Policy makers try to limit increasing health care expendi-
ture by mandating or encouraging Managed Care (MC).
However, attempts to increase the market share of MC
often fail because of a lack of participating physicians. As
long as conventional practice remains an alternative, health
service providers must be won over to MC because they
have to accept limitations of their professional autonomy.
The objective of this contribution is to investigate physi-
cians’ preferences for MC attributes measured as willing-
ness-to-accept (WTA) values. The data come from a
sample of 1,088 Swiss private-practice physicians working
in ambulatory care participating in a discrete choice
experiment (DCE) in 2011.
The MC attributes studied are shared decision-making
and guidelines; reflecting treatment concepts; critical
incident reporting; attending 0, 3, 6, or 12 quality circle
meetings per year, accepting a preferred provider list, and
having drug prescription restricted to generics if available.
To determine the money valuation of MC attributes
expressed as WTA values, a price attribute is included,
defined as a payment per MC-insured per month (IPM) to
compensate the physician for additional cost and effort.
Estimated distribution parameters for the random-coef-
ficient model show that the median Swiss physician likes
shared decision making, three quality circles, and payment;
is indifferent with regard to six quality circles per year; and
dislikes all other MC attributes. The highest share of
opposing physicians is found for the preferred provider list.
All respondents like three quality circles per year. With
respect to strength of opposition, estimated WTA values
reveal that preferred provider and generic drug lists have to
be compensated most, with median WTA ranging from
3.60 CHF/IPM to 5.30 CHF/IPM (1 CHF & 1.1 USD in
2011). These figures exceed the current level of 1.50 CHF/
IPM, which already amounts to 8 % of median physician
Table 7 Willingness-to-accept values, general practitioners vs. specialists
Attribute General practitioners Specialists
MN MD Percentiles
MN MD
Percentiles
5th 95th 5th 95th
Shared decision making -0.58 -0.55 -1.62 0.46 -1.03 -0.70 -4.37 1.07
Guidelines 3.38 4.26 -3.34 7.63 3.47 4.15 -3.15 7.15
Critical incident report. 0.23 0.24 -0.16 0.59 0.68 0.78 -0.59 1.46
Three quality circles -0.90 -0.90 -0.96 -0.85 -0.13 -0.12 -0.56 0.27
Six quality circles -0.98 -0.98 -1.32 -0.64 0.60 0.60 0.20 0.96
Twelve quality circles 2.50 2.49 -0.12 4.92 3.61 3.72 0.93 5.83
Preferred provider list 3.64 3.64 -0.11 6.91 5.94 6.53 -1.30 11.30
Generic drug list 2.93 3.06 -1.70 6.80 4.15 4.44 -0.84 7.55
WTA values are shown in CHF per insured per month, IPM using physician-specific WTA values from interacted RCM
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income. Shared decision making and up to six quality
circles are accepted without compensation.
Clear signs of preference heterogeneity motivate dis-
tinctions between physician groups. For an expansion of
MC, physicians without prior experience with MC-type
attributes need to be attracted. However, some of their WTA
values turn out to be twice as high as those of physicians with
prior experience. Another distinction of importance is
between general practitioners and specialists since some MC
organizations have difficulty offering the full range of spe-
cialties. Indeed, specialists are found to exhibit higher WTA
values than GPs almost without exception; their resistance
against a preferred provider list would have to be overcome
by a payment of 6.53 CHF/IPM, the overall maximum found
in this study. Considering that a current rate for participating
in an HMO is 1.50 CHF/IPM, these findings lead to the
prediction that MC plans designed to achieve cost savings
are unlikely to enlist the majority of Swiss physicians as long
as they retain the option of conventional practice with full
professional autonomy. Realistically, the implementation of
shared decision making, critical incident reporting, and up to
six quality circle meetings per year can be expected. It is
doubtful that future cost savings achievable through treat-
ment guidelines, a preferred provider list, and generic drug
lists are of a magnitude that would permit the current 1.50
CHF/IPM to be doubled or even tripled, reaching compen-
sation amounts that would render MC attractive to the
median physician. Prospects for a voluntary, market-driven
expansion of MC in Switzerland look rather bleak indeed;
quality circles as the one positively valued attribute do not
modify this conclusion.
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Appendix
See Table 8.
Table 8 Preferences for
managed care attributes (model
with interactions)
Attribute Parameter Experience Profession
Value SE Value SE
Shared decision making Mean -0.24 (0.14) 0.28 (0.11)
SD 1.14 (0.16) 0.71 (0.16)
SDM interacted Mean 1.32 (0.17) 0.18 (0.18)
SD 0.35 (0.96) 1.30 (0.27)
Guidelines Mean -1.71 (0.22) -1.55 (0.24)
SD 1.30 (0.32) 2.65 (0.26)
GL interacted Mean 1.25 (0.26) -0.07 (0.31)
SD 0.91 (0.38) 0.79 (0.34)
Critical incident reporting Mean -0.34 (0.10) -0.11 (0.11)
SD 0.37 (0.17) 0.34 (0.24)
CIR interacted Mean 0.54 (0.18) -0.22 (0.17)
SD 0.72 (0.28) 0.61 (0.26)
Preferred provider list Mean -2.50 (0.14) -1.62 (0.13)
SD 2.22 (0.18) 1.49 (0.20)
PPL interacted Mean 1.07 (0.31) -0.95 (0.21)
SD 0.36 (0.43) 2.09 (0.22)
Generic drug list Mean -2.10 (0.19) -1.31 (0.14)
SD 2.48 (0.24) 1.71 (0.14)
GEN interacted Mean 0.41 (0.23) -0.56 (0.20)
SD 0.41 (0.29) 0.65 (0.17)
Three quality circles Mean -0.17 (0.16) 0.42 (0.13)
SD 0.04 (0.29) 0.04 (0.20)
QC3 interacted Mean 0.78 (0.18) -0.37 (0.17)
SD 0.15 (0.19) 0.31 (0.29)
Six quality circles Mean -0.73 (0.17) 0.46 (0.14)
SD 0.03 (0.23) 0.23 (0.27)
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